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| Registros recuperados: 12 | |
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| Jackson, Thomas E.; Irwin, Scott H.; Good, Darrel L.. |
| The purpose of this research report is to present an evaluation of advisory service pricing performance in 1995 for corn and soybeans. Specifically, the average price received by a subscriber to an advisory service is calculated for corn and soybean crops harvested in 1995. The average net advisory price across all 25 corn programs is $3.04 per bushel. The range of net advisory prices for corn is quite large, with a minimum of $2.34 per bushel and a maximum of $3.81 per bushel. The average net advisory price across all 25 soybean programs is $6.61 per bushel. As with corn, the range of net advisory prices for soybeans is substantial, with a minimum of $5.75 per bushel and a maximum of $7.92 per bushel. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project; D4; D7; D8; G1; G2; H4; H8; Q1; Z1; Marketing. |
| Ano: 1997 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14790 |
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| Jackson, Thomas E.; Irwin, Scott H.; Good, Darrel L.. |
| The purpose of this research report is to present an evaluation of advisory service pricing performance in 1996 for corn and soybeans. Specifically, the average price received by a subscriber to an advisory service is calculated for corn and soybean crops harvested in 1996. The average net advisory price across all 26 corn programs is $2.63 per bushel. The range of net advisory prices for corn is quite large, with a minimum of $2.08 per bushel and a maximum of $3.12 per bushel. The average net advisory price across all 24 soybean programs is $7.27 per bushel. As with corn, the range of net advisory prices for soybeans is substantial, with a minimum of $6.80 per bushel and a maximum of $7.80 per bushel. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural Market Advisory Services; G1; D8; D7; D4; G2; H4; H8; Q1; Z1; Marketing. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14787 |
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| Guinnane, Timothy W.. |
| Banks play a greater role in the German financial system than in the United States or Britain. Germanys large universal banks are admired by those who advocate bank deregulation in the United States. Others admire the universal banks for their supposed role in corporate governance and industrial finance. Many discussions distort the German Banking system by overstressing one of several types of banks, and ignore the competition and cooperation between the famous universal banks and other banking groups. Tracing the historical development of the German banking system from the early nineteenth century places the large universal banks in context. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Universal banking; German banks; German economic history; Financial Economics; G2; G3; N2. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28447 |
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| Ashraf, Nava; Karlan, Dean S.; Yin, Wesley. |
| Informal lending and savings institutions exist around the world, and often include regular door-to-door deposit collection of cash. Some banks have adopted similar services in order to expand access to banking services in areas that lack physical branches. Using a randomized control trial, we investigate determinants of participation in a deposit collection service and evaluate the impact of offering the service for micro-savers of a rural bank in the Philippines. Of 137 individuals offered the service in the treatment group, 38 agreed to sign-up, and 20 regularly used the service. Take-up is predicted by distance to the bank (a measure of transaction costs of depositing without the service) as well as being married (a suggestion that household bargaining... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Savings behavior; Microfinance; Field experiment; Savings mobilization; Deposit collector; Financial Economics; D1; D9; G1; G2; O1. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28502 |
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| Gennaioli, Nicola; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert. |
| We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive. Financial innovation can make both investors and... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Financial Innovation; Financial Fragility; Securities; Risks; Financial Economics; G; G11; G15; G2. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96496 |
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| Finger, Robert. |
| The level of natural hedge, i.e. the (negative) correlation between price and yield levels, is an important determinant for farmers’ income risks and their demand for risk management instruments. The natural hedge is often approximated with correlations observed at more aggregated levels, e.g. the county level. This induces biases because the natural hedge at the farm-level is smaller than on more aggregated levels. In this paper, we put this idea one step forward and investigate the empirical relationship between price-yield correlations and the underlying crop acreage, using farm-level data for 5 crops in Switzerland. We find that, for instance, a 1% increase in area under maize and intensive barley leads to a change in the correlation by -0.02 and... |
| Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Price-yield correlation; Aggregation bias; Crop insurance; Risk and Uncertainty; Q1; G2. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122538 |
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| Ferri, Giovanni. |
| Rating agencies' track record is good in developed countries but poor in emerging economies. Why? Given the almost-monopolistic structure of the industry, we conjecture that agencies might underinvest in information gathering. We propose an indicator quantifying the agencies' effort to gather information and assess whether greater effort affects rating levels. We detect: (i) absolute underinvestment for non-OECD sovereigns (less effort in spite of greater opaqueness); (ii) relative underinvestment for non-OECD firms compared with OECD ones (though the former receive a larger effort, more intense effort boosts firm ratings in non-OECD countries while depressing them in OECD countries). |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Sovereign risk; Credit ratings; Rating agencies’ effort; G2; G3. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43847 |
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| Luigi, Zingales. |
| The U.S. system of security law was designed more than 70 years ago to regain investors’ trust after a major financial crisis. Today we face a similar problem. But while in the 1930s the prevailing perception was that investors had been defrauded by offerings of dubious quality securities, in the new millennium, investors’ perception is that they have been defrauded by managers who are not accountable to anyone. For this reason, I propose a series of reforms that center around corporate governance, while shifting the focus from the protection of unsophisticated investors in the purchasing of new securities issues to the investment in mutual funds, pension funds, and other forms of asset management. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: U.S. Security Law; Securities Regulation; Trust; Financial Economics; G2; G28; G01. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50356 |
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| Guinnane, Timothy W.. |
| Research on trust now forms a prominent part of the research agenda in history and the social sciences. Although this research has generated useful insights, the idea of trust has been used so widely and loosely that it risks creating more confusion than clarity. This essay argues that to the extent that scholars have a clear idea of what trust actually means, the concept is, at least for economic questions, superfluous: the useful parts of the idea of trust are implicit in older notions of information and the ability to impose sanctions. I trust you in a transaction because of what I know about you, and because of what I can have done to you should you cheat me. This observation does not obviate what many scholars intend, which is to embed economic... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Trust; Social capital; Credit cooperatives; Uniform laws; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; G2; N2. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28440 |
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| Registros recuperados: 12 | |
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